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ECONOMIC OBSERVATIONS ON CITIZEN-
SUIT PROVISIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
LEGISLATION
A.H. BARNETT* AND TIMOTHY D. TERRELL**
The statesman, who should attempt to direct private people in what
manner they ought to employ their capitals, would not only load
himself with a most unnecessary attention, but assume an authority
which could safely be trusted, not only to no single person, but to
no council or senate whatever, and which would nowhere be so
dangerous as in the hands of a man who had folly and presumption
enough to fancy himself fit to exercise it.
1
INTRODUCTION
On January 12, 2000, the United States Supreme Court handed
down its decision in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environ-
mental Services, Inc.2  The 7-2 opinion, delivered by Justice Ginsburg,
marked an important reversal of a decade-long trend toward a strict
reading of standing requirements in environmental citizen suits.  This
strict reading is demonstrated by two cases early in the 1990s, Lujan
v. National Wildlife Federation3 and Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,4
which marked the first significant restrictions on standing since the
Court began its liberal reading of citizen-suit provisions in the late
1960s.  The 1997 Bennett v. Spear5 decision, by expanding standing to
encompass regulated landowners, essentially reinforced the negative
* American University of Sharjah, United Arab Emirates.
** Wofford College, Spartanburg, South Carolina.  The authors are indebted to the par-
ticipants at the Duke Environmental Law & Policy Forum’s “Citizen Suits and the Future of
Standing in the 21st Century” conference held in March of 2000, as well as to the research staff
and 1998 summer seminar participants at the Political Economy Research Center in Bozeman,
Montana, in particular Daniel Benjamin and Jonathan Adler.  We are also grateful to Michelle
Vasser for her indispensable assistance in editing and to Fred McChesney for his insightful
comments.  Of course, we bear all responsibility for errors and omissions in our work.
1. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 423 (Random House 1937) (1776).
2. 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
3. 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
4. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
5. 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
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effect these two earlier decisions had on enforcement of environ-
mental regulation.  More recently, the Steel Company v. Citizens for a
Better Environment6 decision confirmed the shift back to a more con-
servative, Hohfeldian view of standing.7
Laidlaw is key to the future of citizen suits.  Friends of the Earth
and other plaintiff-petitioners filed a citizen suit against Laidlaw En-
vironmental Services in 1992, alleging noncompliance with a National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit at Laid-
law’s wastewater treatment plant in Roebuck, South Carolina.  In
1997, the District Court assessed a civil penalty of over $400,000.  On
appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the court reasoned that since Laidlaw
had come into compliance with its permit before the judgment by the
District Court, the case had become moot.8  The case was appealed to
the Supreme Court.
The Court reversed the Fourth Circuit, rejecting Laidlaw’s
mootness claim.  This landmark decision may be expected to encour-
age future citizen suits.9  In the majority opinion of the Court, plain-
tiffs’ concern that water was polluted, and a belief that the pollution
had reduced the value of their homes was deemed sufficient for injury
in fact.  No actual damage to the environment was found by the dis-
trict court.10  Clearly, with the threshold for a “concrete and particu-
larized” “injury”11 so lowered, environmental interest groups could
hope that the standing rights that were weakened in the 1990s were
now being reinstated.
Our task in this paper is to address the central economic issues in
6. 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
7. The Hohfeldian plaintiff must have a substantial stake in the outcome of the decision,
as “one who has been concretely damaged by the defendant’s’ actions and therefore seeks to
advance his own interests by litigation.”  See David M. Ifshin, Note, Standing to Challenge Ex-
clusionary Land Use Devices in Federal Courts after Warth v. Seldin, 29 STAN. L. REV. 323, 325
n.15 (1977); see also Michael C.  Jensen et al., Analysis of Alternative Standing Doctrines, 6 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 205, 209 (1986).  The Hohfeldian doctrine is discussed critically by Louis L.
Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116
U. PA. L. REV. 1033 (1968); see also Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Con-
ceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
8. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 149 F.3d. 303 (4th Cir. 1998).
9. The mootness doctrine and injury in fact standing, though different, are both under-
girded by Article III.  In Laidlaw, the Fourth Circuit had assumed injury in fact standing be-
cause they were convinced that the case had become moot.  The Supreme Court, in rejecting the
circuit court’s assessment of mootness, reexamined the standing issue in light of Lujan v. De-
fenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992).
10. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 956 F. Supp. 588, 600
(D.S.C. 1997).  See also infra note 152 and accompanying text.
11. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
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citizen-suit provisions of environmental legislation and the doctrine of
standing as it is applied in that context.  We make no attempt to ad-
dress the myriad legal issues inherent in the subject.  Likewise, we
offer no conjectures about the Court’s rationale for its seemingly in-
consistent rulings.  We leave these things to legal scholars.
Our article is organized as follows.  In Part I we discuss the con-
cept of standing as a property right.  Part II discusses the payoffs to
“private attorneys general” who enforce environmental statutes.  We
discuss the affect that environmental groups can have on the alloca-
tion of property rights by setting court agendas in Part III.  Part IV
contains our discussion of how citizen suits can be used by firms to
raise their rivals’ costs.  In Part V we address a misapplication of the
economics of collective action that purportedly shows that citizen
suits overcome obstacles to the expression of majoritarian interests.
Part VI briefly discusses the implications of the Laidlaw Court’s de-
termination that “concern” is sufficient basis for standing and Part
VII contains our concluding comments.
I. STANDING AS A PROPERTY RIGHT
A small proprietor, however, who knows every part of his little ter-
ritory, who views it all with the affection which property, especially
small property, naturally inspires, and who upon that account takes
pleasure not only in cultivating but in adorning it, is generally of all
improvers the most industrious, the most intelligent, and the most
successful.12
A group that is granted standing to sue gains something of value.
This gain can be expressed as an acquisition of certain property rights
by one group from another.  For several decades, the citizen-suit pro-
visions in environmental statutes have granted standing to environ-
mental advocacy groups, while denying similar standing to landown-
ers and other environmental resource owners.  This grant of standing
is equivalent to awarding advocacy groups some dimension of prop-
erty rights in the environmental resource.  If an advocacy group has
standing to sue for the enforcement of regulations affecting a re-
source owner’s property, while the resource owner has no standing to
sue for the retraction of those regulations, the advocacy groups have
influence over the use of the resource that the resource owner does
not have.  This “influence over the use” of a resource is equivalent to
a degree of property right in that resource.
12. SMITH, supra note 1, at 392. 
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Similarly, if an advocacy group can claim “injury in fact” for a
change in a resource owner’s choice of uses of the resource, the group
has standing to sue to enjoin that change.  To be able to claim injury
in fact, the group must have some right to the use of the resource
owner’s property.
A grant of standing to an environmental advocacy group is thus a
transfer of property rights from resource owners to environmental
interest groups.  In Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,13 Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife,14 and Bennett v. Spear,15 the transfer of property
rights went in the other direction—from environmental interest
groups back to landowners.  The Lujan cases’ limitation of environ-
mental groups’ standing reduces the benefits to those groups and
therefore shifts property rights to landowners; Bennett’s extension of
standing to landowners makes it easier to challenge environmental
groups, also shifting relative power and property rights.  To better
understand the transfer of property rights, it is beneficial to discuss in
more precise terms the nature of property rights and exactly what ef-
fects citizen suits and legislative action have on these rights.
A. Bundles of Property Rights and Unbundling of Rights
Property rights come in bundles.  A landowner may have the
right to graze cattle or build a subdivision or drill for oil on his land.
These rights, and many more, are held as a bundle by the landowner,
but other individuals or groups may hold certain other rights.  A
landowner may have the right to raise cattle or engage in other activi-
ties on his property, but he may not have the right to destroy the habi-
tat of certain endangered species living on the property.  A home-
owner may have the right to live in his house, but he may not have the
right to operate a junkyard from his front lawn or paint his house
purple.
These rights may be unbundled, to some extent, by the property
owner.  A land developer who wishes to raise the value of his land
may sell only certain bundles of rights to those who buy lots from
him.  A common method of accomplishing this end with residential
property is to sell “covenanted” deeds, which divest the purchaser of
rights to use the land in ways that tend to impose negative external-
ities on neighbors.16
13. 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
14. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
15. 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
16. Given the preferences of local residents, of course.  Some individuals will be willing to
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Governmental regulation is another way of unbundling property
rights.  Regulation may take several rights from the environmental
resource owner and either abolish them, turn them over to govern-
ment, or turn them over to a third party.
As a consequence of the ability to use political resources to gen-
erate regulation to control resource use, terrific battles rage over
bundles of property rights.  Resource owners attempt to keep prop-
erty rights from being removed from their bundle without acceptable
compensation, while interest groups attempt to use the government as
an unbundler, or re-arranger of the bundles.  That is, interest groups
lobby legislatures for regulations that remove rights from the envi-
ronmental resource owner and abolish them, transfer the rights to the
groups themselves, or grant other rights to the group.17
In taking a right from an environmental resource owner’s bundle
of property rights, regulation may transfer the same right or grant a
related right to another party.  The right taken from the resource
owner, however, may not necessarily be granted to another group.
For example, a landowner may be forced to refrain from developing a
portion of his land, but the interest group that lobbied to stop the de-
velopment is usually not granted the right to develop that land.
Rather, the interest group is often granted a different right—perhaps
the right to have the landowner’s property managed in a certain man-
ner or maintained for the benefit of a species the interest group
wishes to preserve.
While groups such as The Nature Conservancy have purchased
easements as a means of preserving environmental resources, the
method by which many environmental advocacy groups succeed in
changing the allocation of property rights is through legislative action.
If the desired legislation or regulation is enacted, the advocacy group
is then faced with the problem of motivating the bureaucracy charged
with implementing and enforcing environmental legislation.  This is
often done through the courts by filing lawsuits against agencies that
do not enforce regulatory law with sufficient vigor.
Everyone has some access to the legislative (and, thereby, the
regulatory) process, through voting, lobbying, making campaign con-
tributions, or other political activity.  The judicial process is quite dif-
pay extra to live in areas with many covenanted restrictions, while others will want to live in
areas where there are few restrictions.  The ability to contract for property rights enhances the
social value more than having one set of rules forced upon all.
17. See generally FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT
EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION (1997).
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ferent, however.  Traditionally, access to the courts has been re-
stricted.18  An advocacy group wishing to ensure the vigorous en-
forcement of a regulation could find itself denied access due to
standing requirements.  Citizen-suit provisions have provided envi-
ronmental interest groups with an avenue into the judicial process.
Universal standing grants, made through the legislative process, are
thus a device to produce unbundling.19
Environmental resource owners, of course, seek to maintain all
of the rights in their bundles and to regain others that have been lost
to government, environmental interest groups, or other groups.  The
same courses of action taken by environmental interest groups in un-
bundling rights are taken by the environmental resource owners in
their attempts to reacquire and rebundle these rights.
With Bennett v. Spear,20 it became readily apparent that citizen-
suit provisions could be made to work for environmental resource
owners as well as against them.  Bennett enhanced landowners’
standing to sue for retention of rights to irrigation water—in other
words, standing to sue for the right to keep particular water rights in
the bundle of rights pertaining to their property.21
B. Unbundling and the Value of Rebundled Property Rights
The value of a property right, once unbundled, might not only be
diminished in value itself, but can diminish the value of related prop-
erty rights.  Certain rights are complementary in consumption, or in a
production sense, certain sub-bundles of rights are useful only in fixed
or near-fixed proportions.  For example, the right to graze cattle on
land may be useful to a land owner only if the land owner retains the
right to use water flowing across the land to water the cattle.  The
value of the right to use the open ocean to fish for tuna may be seri-
ously diminished if one does not also hold the right to catch the occa-
sional dolphin.  The value of a right to a resource owner may be much
greater when taken in conjunction with the other rights he holds than
it would be unbundled and held separately by an advocacy group.22
18. See, e.g., Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923); Muskrat v. United States, 219
U.S. 346 (1911).
19. They may also produce rebundling, as we discuss infra Part II.
20. See 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
21. See id.
22. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), the Supreme Court
determined that the abolition of the plaintiff’s right to develop two coastal lots had so dimin-
ished the value of his property as to constitute a “taking” compensable under the Fifth Amend-
ment.  We surmise that certain property rights were complements to others in the bundle.  It
I - ECONOMIC OBSERVATIONS - BARNETT & TERRELL.DOC 04/25/01  9:33 AM
Fall 2001] ECONOMIC OBSERVATIONS ON CITIZEN-SUIT STANDING 7
We cannot, of course, make the mistake of presuming that all
unbundling is welfare reducing.  We frequently observe environ-
mental resource owners voluntarily unbundling and selling particular
property rights (e.g. easements, covenanted deeds, mineral rights,
etc.).  These rights may be purchased and held singly, but we often
see related rights being removed from their original bundles and re-
bundled into a new, more valuable bundle of rights by an individual
or firm.  Consider the example of a power company that purchases an
easement from a landowner, Jones, to construct and maintain trans-
mission lines over a portion of Jones’ land.  Unless Jones is the only
owner of property between the generation facility and the city, the
power company will need to acquire similar easements from other
landowners.  Without a complete set of easements on contiguous par-
cels of land between the generator and the consumer, an easement on
Jones’ land is valueless to the power company.  When bundled with
other easements, however, the easement on Jones’ land becomes
more valuable to the power company than to Jones, and Jones may be
enticed to unbundle and sell that property right to the power com-
pany.  As long as the transaction is voluntary, we can say that the
power company pays the opportunity cost of the right.
C. Liberalized Standing and Economic Efficiency
Jensen et al. have discussed the efficiency consequences of the
rebundling that occurs when liberal standing rules provide an effec-
tively unbounded class of plaintiffs access to courts.23  In brief, liberal
standing rules preclude the Coasean bargained solutions that both
economize transaction costs and produce efficient resource alloca-
tions.24  When rights are alienable, voluntary exchanges between
property owners—exchanges that are based on real factors like tastes
and relative scarcity, not judicial decrees—determine how resources
will be used.25  When one property owner violates the rights of an-
may seem that this conclusion is unnecessary—after all, could not the right to develop itself be
worth the amount of the loss in market value?  Consider, however, what would happen to the
value of Mr. Lucas’ property if he had lost the right to bar trespassers, or the right to prevent the
military from using it as an artillery practice zone.  We can no more say that the right to develop
was itself worth the amount of the loss in market value, than we can say that the right to bar
trespassers from the land is itself worth the loss were it removed.  These rights are complemen-
tary in consumption.  Taking away Mr. Lucas’ right to develop is like removing the radiator
from a car—the radiator adds no more value to the car than the alternator, but the loss of either
one will make the car completely valueless for its intended purpose.
23. See generally Jensen et al., supra note 7.
24. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
25. See Jensen et al., supra note 7, at 206.
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other, say by emitting pollutants that damage the property of the
other, the damaged property owner generally would have standing to
bring suit under the common law of nuisance in order to gain relief
and/or compensation.  As a consequence, the individual who pro-
duces harm has incentive to bargain with parties who might suffer
damage to gain permission for discharging pollutants (if the value of
the right to discharge exceeds the value of damages caused by dis-
charge) or to stop emitting pollutants (if the value of damages ex-
ceeds the value of the right to discharge).
On the other hand, when standing is universal, such bargained
solutions are ruled out.  An agreement with the originally damaged
parties granting permission to emit is of little value if any “con-
cerned” citizen has standing to sue.  In effect, universal standing de-
stroys the alienability of emission rights.26  As Jensen et al. note, “lib-
eralizations of standing block the transfer of resources from less valu-
able to more valuable uses.”27  With liberalized standing, the welfare-
enhancing, voluntary unbundling of specific rights for rebundling by
another party is constrained by the possibility of intervention and
nullification of the agreement by a “concerned” citizen.  Suppose a
firm seeks to acquire a set of easements for its water pollution dis-
charge from all potentially damaged downstream parties.  Any in-
creases in value that might occur through these contracts are fore-
closed because of the insurmountable transaction costs of contracting
with the millions of potential plaintiffs.
II.  PAYOFFS TO PRIVATE ENFORCERS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
STATUTES
As every individual, therefore, endeavours as much as he can both
to employ his capital in the support of domestic industry, and so to
direct that industry that its produce may be of the greatest value;
every individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue
of the society as great as he can.  He generally, indeed, neither in-
tends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is
promoting it.  By preferring the support of domestic to that of for-
eign industry, he intends only his own security; and by directing
that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest
value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many
other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was
no part of his intention.  Nor is it always the worse for the society
26. See id. at 207.
27. Id. at 205; see also Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1111 (1972).
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that it was no part of it.  By pursuing his own interest he frequently
promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really
intends to promote it.  I have never known much good done by
those who affected to trade for the public good.28
It is tempting to assume that environmental advocacy groups are
interested in enforcing environmental regulations for ideological or
public-interest reasons.  However, when we are concerned with the
standing issue and citizen-suit provisions, this approach may oversim-
plify the motives of these groups.  Even if environmentalists are
ideologically motivated, i.e., they wish to maximize environmental
purity, they are still subject to budget constraints.  Obtaining pecuni-
ary rewards by helping to unbundle and rebundle property rights al-
lows for expanded activities in other areas.  Economic incentives do
matter even if environmentalists are motivated primarily by altruism
(i.e. environmental purity).29
As Greve shows, there can be financial returns for filing citizen
suits, and environmental advocacy groups have not neglected the
economic rents that broadened standing makes possible.30  In fact, the
revenues that citizen-suit provisions have made possible for environ-
mental advocacy groups can be so substantial that the provisions may
be considered “an off-budget entitlement program for the environ-
mental movement.”31
Though settlements obtained by citizen suits filed against private
firms are ostensibly structured to avoid providing a profit motive to
citizen enforcers, there are two elements common in these settle-
ments that can produce a pecuniary reward to citizen suits.  The first
element is the set of “credit” programs, which amount to payments to
environmental organizations; the second is the above-cost reim-
bursement of attorneys’ fees.  We argue that environmental law is
written in such a way that a cartel of environmental advocacy groups
is formed and maintained through citizen suits.
A. Citizen Suits and Enforcement of Regulation
1. Optimal Enforcement, Bounty Hunting, and Citizen Suits
Regulation, because of the high cost of writing precise law, usu-
28. SMITH, supra note 1, at 423 (emphasis added). 
29. See Michael S. Greve, The Private Enforcement of Environmental Law, 65 TUL. L.
REV. 339, 363 (1990).
30. See id. at 341.
31. See id.
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ally results in inadvertent restraints on innocent or beneficial activi-
ties.  Budget constraints and political pressures act as a check on the
enforcement of regulatory law by government enforcers.32  This can
produce an optimal level of enforcement.  As with drug law enforce-
ment, achieving zero illegal activity is suboptimal because too many
scarce resources would need to be diverted from other, marginally
more beneficial, uses.  Governments will prosecute egregious viola-
tions, but pursuing the less significant offenses does not create enough
environmental benefit to justify the use of limited funds and runs the
risk of upsetting voters.  However, private enforcers of environmental
law are unresponsive to political pressures, and have no reason to
avoid exceeding the optimal level of enforcement.  Because private
enforcers may go after every type of offense (even paperwork viola-
tions in which environmental damage is minimal), they may over-
enforce the law, diverting too many resources from other uses.  While
politicians or state bureaucrats who implement or enforce laws detri-
mental to the community would suffer loss of position or funding, pri-
vate interest groups may lobby for increased regulation or file citizen
suits without paying the same price.
The stated intent of citizen-suit provisions may be to increase the
effectiveness of regulation by extending enforcement power to those
citizens’ groups that are closest to the problem.  However, Greve’s
comparison of environmental citizen suits with old-time bounty
hunting casts some doubt on the assumed public-interest motives of
citizen plaintiffs.33  Successful private enforcers may receive substan-
tial bounties—rewards for successful prosecution—in two forms: at-
torneys’ fees and credit programs.  Greve demonstrates that the effect
of citizen-suit requirements is the subsidization of the environmental
movement.34  The citizen-suit provision in the Clean Water Act,35 in
particular, lowered the cost of information to environmental advocacy
groups to such an extent that they were able to engage in protracted
campaigns that transferred wealth from regulation violators to the
advocacy groups.36
32. See William H. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-
Group Perspective, 18 J. L. & ECON. 875, 889 (1975); see also Greve, supra note 29, at 344.
33. See Michael S. Greve, Private Enforcement, Private Rewards: How Environmental Citi-
zen Suits Became an Entitlement Program, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC COSTS,
PRIVATE REWARDS 105 (Michael S. Greve & Fred L. Smith eds., 1992).
34. See Greve, supra note 29, at 340.
35. Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1994).
36. See Greve, supra note 29, at 361.
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2. Preclusion of Citizen Suits and Enforcement Activity
Because the object of citizen-suit provisions is supposed to be in-
creased levels of enforcement, citizen suits may be filed as long as an
enforcement action is not already under way by the relevant agency.37
That a citizen suit is under way, however, does not necessarily pre-
clude an agency enforcement action.38  But why allow an agency ac-
tion to follow a citizen suit and not also the other way around?
The answer has to do with the effect on the rewards to environ-
mental advocacy groups.  The system in place allows plaintiffs to be
rewarded for discovering and initiating suits based on unpunished,
current violations only.  Cutting citizen suits short or reducing the al-
lowable penalties if an agency action is initiated would reduce the ex-
pected value of citizen suits to these groups.  Allowing environmental
advocacy groups to sue for past violations after an agency action has
commenced would reduce the incentive for environmental groups to
seek out current violations.  Both parties—the enforcement agency
and the advocacy groups—benefit from the structure of the enforce-
ment system.  The environmental rule-makers receive a higher level
of enforcement, which increases the effect of their rules.  Advocacy
groups receive substantial transfers in two forms, which are discussed
below.
B. Attorneys’ Fees
The first element in settlements that benefits environmental
37. See, e.g., Clean Water Act 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (1994).  This can lead to some strange
legal situations.  Laidlaw Environmental Services asked South Carolina’s Department of Health
and Environmental Control to file a lawsuit against it, so as to preclude the citizen suit Friends
of the Earth and Citizens Local Environmental Action Network had intended to file.  See
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 890 F. Supp. 470 (D.S.C. 1995).  There
remains some ambiguity about which enforcement actions preclude citizen suits, at least with
respect to the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A) (1994) and the Air Pollution Preven-
tion and Control (Clean Air) Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(B) (1994).  See Heather L. Clauson,
How Far Should the Bar on Citizen Suits Extend Under 309 of the Clean Water Act?, 27 ENVTL.
L. 967 (1997); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Issues Raised by Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environ-
mental Services: Access to the Courts for Environmental Plaintiffs, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
F. 207 (2001).
38. See Arkansas Wildlife Fed’n v. ICI Ams., Inc., 29 F.3d 376, 380 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating
that citizen suits “should not considerably curtail the governing agency’s discretion to act in the
public interest”).  If the citizen suit were under way before the agency action began, the violator
can still be held liable, even for the same violations.  For example, after the State of New Jersey
had levied a fine of $275,000 against Elf Atochem North America, Inc., the Public Interest Re-
search Group of New Jersey settled with Elf Atochem in a citizen suit for a $1,017,500 penalty.
See Clauson, supra note 37, at 981; see also Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Elf Auto-
chem N. Am., Inc., 817 F. Supp 1164 (D.N.J. 1993).
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groups is the above-cost reimbursement of attorneys’ fees and litiga-
tion costs to plaintiff organizations.39  This reimbursement can be very
lucrative for plaintiffs, because rates are based on the “market rate”
for for-profit, private attorneys, not the rates charged by the public-
interest lawyers such plaintiffs typically use.  These reimbursements
can far exceed the environmental advocacy groups’ payments to pub-
lic-interest lawyers, staff lawyers, and other associated costs.40
Student Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. AT
& T Bell Laboratories41 explicitly endorses the payment of above-cost
fees to prevailing parties in environmental suits.  The court held that
the “community market rate” rule is appropriate for calculating fees
awarded to a public-interest law firm in a Clean Water Act suit, even
though the firm charged its clients rates dramatically below the mar-
ket rate.  The attorneys’ fees were therefore awarded at a rate of $85-
$185 per hour rather than the firm’s billing rate of $60-$80 per hour.42
The circuit court’s decision rested primarily on the Supreme Court’s
holding in Blum v. Stenson,43 in which a non-profit legal aid society
was entitled to receive reimbursements based on the market rate even
though it did not have a conventional billing rate and would have re-
ceived no fees from its clients.
Attorneys’ fees are, in the aggregate, a much larger proportion of
settlements than Treasury fines.  A 1983 study revealed that “an
amount equivalent to about 400 percent of the penalties paid to the
federal Treasury was paid to reimburse environmental groups for
their attorneys [sic] fees.”44  This brings us to the second factor that
makes citizen suits particularly remunerative for environmental
groups—credit programs.
39. Attorneys’ fees may be part of the settlement with a private firm, or, in cases against
the U.S. Government, advocacy groups may petition to receive federal compensation for legal
costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 28 U.S.C. §
2412 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
40. See generally Greve, supra note 29, at 356-359; JONATHAN H. ADLER,
ENVIRONMENTALISM AT THE CROSSROADS: GREEN ACTIVISM IN AMERICA (1997).
41. 842 F.2d 1436, 1450 (3d Cir. 1988).
42. See id. at 1448.
43. 465 U.S. 886 (1984).
44. William H. Lewis, Jr., Environmentalists’ Authority to Sue Industry for Civil Penalties is
Unconstitutional Under the Separation of Powers Doctrine, 16 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,101, 10,102
(1986).
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C. Credit Programs and Collusive Arrangements Among
Environmental Groups
The second type of transfer to environmental advocacy groups
comes in the form of credit projects.  Credit projects, sometimes
called “supplemental environmental projects” or “mitigation proj-
ects,” may constitute a part of a settlement in lieu of fines.  Though
the plaintiff organization(s) are generally excluded from the group of
recipients, credit programs benefit the environmental movement as a
whole.  If environmental advocacy groups behave collusively, it is not
unreasonable to expect that they would work to one another’s gain in
this respect.
For environmental groups as a whole, fines paid to the U.S.
Treasury are much less attractive than credit projects.  Though an
ideologically motivated environmental advocacy group might see de-
terrence value in punitive fines to the Treasury, such a group would
certainly perceive settlement dollars as more likely to benefit the en-
vironment if they were disbursed by environmentalists rather than
diverted to the government’s general purposes.  Therefore, there is an
incentive to press for more credit projects in the settlement of envi-
ronmental suits.  This may explain why credit projects are far more
common in private settlements than in government settlements, and
constitute a much larger proportion of private settlements.45  Viola-
tors have incentives to consent to credit projects for several reasons.
They are tax deductible in many cases, have positive public-relations
value, and the environmental advocacy group will often negotiate
substantial discounts for including credit projects.
Credit projects must represent a large discount over the statutory
fines that might be ordered by a court, not only to entice the violators
into a cost-reducing settlement, but also because citizen suits do not
preclude an enforcement action by a government agency for the same
violation(s).46  Data from private settlements bear this out.  Lewis
found that over ninety percent of citizen-suit penalties paid by indus-
try in 1983 for violations of the Clean Water Act went to environ-
mental organizations, not to the Treasury.47  Boyer and Meidinger
analyzed twenty-nine cases from January 1983 to May 1985 and found
that more than sixty-five percent of the settlements went to environ-
45. See Greve, supra note 29, at 358.
46. See id. at 357 n.79.
47. See Lewis, supra note 44, at 10,102.
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mental organizations.48  Greve confirmed these findings:
[T]hirty private enforcement actions brought against alleged pol-
luters in Connecticut between 1983 and 1986 were settled for pay-
ments in excess of $1,500,000.  Attorney’s [sic] fees paid to the
Connecticut Fund for the Environment and the NRDC—the two
organizations that brought the vast majority of these cases—
amounted to $492,036; $869,500 was paid to the Open Space
Institute, an organization established by the NRDC as a repository
for case settlements in Clean Water Act suits.  No fines were paid
to the Treasury.49
Greve notes that outside Connecticut during the same time pe-
riod, thirty-one cases settled for a total of $5,136,438, of which
$3,692,050 went to environmental organizations and other non-
Treasury groups.50
What, then, keeps the settlement from being negotiated down to
a credit project of near-zero value?  A credit project of $1 would pro-
vide environmental advocacy groups as a whole with more revenues
than a very large fine paid to the Treasury.  Why do the violators not
hold out for a statutory fine payable to the Treasury?  There are two
reasons.  First, violators incur heavy legal costs for continuing their
defense.  “Holding out” is costly, and the defendant will settle when
the marginal reduction in the settlement value from continuing to de-
fend is equal to the marginal cost of continuing litigation.  Second,
environmental advocacy groups, unlike violators, receive positive re-
turns from continuing litigation.  Greve proposes several reasons why
this is the case.  “First, environmental organizations are ‘repeat play-
ers.’  They have to demonstrate to potential future targets that they
are prepared to litigate; otherwise, their leverage in future negotia-
tions will decline.”51  Environmental advocacy groups develop a repu-
tation that, in the long run, would produce a greater willingness on
the part of violators to settle.  Also, “an ideologically motivated en-
forcer may assign a positive value to strict law enforcement per se
(that is, he may decide to collect a portion of his rent in nonmonetary
benefits).”52  Finally, environmental advocacy groups can attract and
keep members who want to see their dollars used to discover and
punish those who cause environmental damage.  Greve writes, “envi-
48. See Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Prelimi-
nary Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 833, 933
n.237 (1985).
49. Greve, supra note 29, at 359.
50. See id. at 359 n.87.
51. Id. at 357 n.79.
52. Id.
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ronmental organizations maintain their membership base and their
reputation in part by projecting an uncompromising attitude.  The
need to maintain an adversarial posture may make litigation margin-
ally more attractive.”53
In short, environmental advocacy groups enjoy a legal advantage
over defendants that gives them greater bargaining power in settle-
ment negotiations.  Violators do not tend to be “repeat players” to
the extent of continually litigating environmental advocacy groups,
and face much higher legal expenses since they do not have the bene-
fit of low-cost public-interest attorneys.
D. Environmental Advocacy Groups as a Cartel
It may be helpful in this context to think of environmental advo-
cacy groups as firms producing a service and behaving in some re-
spects as ordinary for-profit firms behave.  Environmental groups
produce, among other things, monitoring of environmental quality
and enforcement54 of environmental regulations.  This production
process is made less costly by the institution of citizen suits that re-
duce barriers to entry into the courts.  Environmental advocacy
groups are not bystanders watching their costs fall.  Rather, they are
actively coordinating their activities55 to lower their collective costs of
enforcement and to increase the amount of enforcement.  This does
not imply that they do not have altruistic motives for their activities.56
Through citizen-suit provisions, the plaintiffs’ costs are lowered
(in contrast to the costs that must be incurred in most common law
litigation), and through credit projects and above-cost reimburse-
ments of legal fees, the plaintiff’s revenues increase.  This two-
pronged strategy provides plaintiff organizations with abnormal re-
turns.  The cooperation between environmental advocacy groups in
mining the citizen-suit provisions for economic rents indicates the
presence of a cartel.57
53. Id.
54. The term “enforcement” is used loosely here—the environmental groups act (through
litigation and other forms of persuasion) to press the government regulatory agencies into
stronger enforcement.
55. For example, the major environmental groups, organized as the “Green Group,” meet
regularly in Washington, D.C.  See ADLER, supra note 40, at 98.
56. See Greve, supra note 29, at 368.
57. See id. at 341.  Care must be taken in using the term “cartel” here.  Typically, econo-
mists define a cartel as an association of firms that explicitly coordinate activities in order to
extract monopoly rents, i.e., restrict output and entry so as to raise price above economic cost.
See THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 206-211 (Peter Newman
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In the absence of a cartel, we would expect to see environmental
organizations competing away more resources in expensive member-
ship drives, bids for foundation grants, races for the best environ-
mental projects and enforcement suits,58 and competition for other
revenue sources.  A cartel can reduce these costs, restrict potential
entrants into the environmental advocacy market, and achieve rents
for cartel members.  However, each advocacy group has an incentive
to “cheat” on the cartel by raising publicity expenditures beyond the
cartel-assigned amount.  Potential entrants, likewise, could choose a
relatively high level of expenditures on publicity.  This would procure
additional members for the new advocacy group, perhaps at the ex-
pense of cartel members.  There must be an effective enforcement
mechanism for the cartel to remain viable.
There are at least two possibilities for an enforcement mecha-
nism, and they could function in tandem.  First, we know that lawsuit
settlements with private firms result in payments to environmental
groups.59  Legally, these payments may be made to any groups desig-
nated by the plaintiff, subject to court approval.60  If an environmental
organization were to cheat on the cartel, or if a potential entrant into
the environmental advocacy market were to begin a strong member-
ship drive, it would be relatively easy for the cartel to direct settle-
ment money away from that organization.
The second possibility for an enforcement mechanism is the dis-
pensing of foundation money.  Some foundations have an interest,
ideological or otherwise, in promoting the efficient operation of the
environmental advocacy groups they support.  If they can reduce the
diffusion of resources that occurs in the competitive process, they can
receive an increased amount of services from these groups.  Large
foundations can simply cut funding to any group that violates the car-
tel they have set up.
Private foundations provide about one fifth of environmental ad-
vocacy group income, second only to memberships as a source of
ed., 1998).  In our article the definition is expanded to encompass those groups that coordinate
activities to lower their collective costs and to increase output within the group.
58. That is, those projects and lawsuits that provide the highest level of benefits for the
lowest costs.
59. See infra Part III.B & C.
60. See Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 652 F. Supp. 620 (D. Md.
1987) (resulting in a judgment that required the steel company to make “donations” to the Trust
for Public Lands ($200,000), the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation ($100,000), and Save
Our Streams ($50,000)); see also ADLER, supra note 40, at 46.
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revenues.61  Whatever motivates foundation giving will influence envi-
ronmental group activities.  Some foundations are clearly insulated
from outside pressures, often intentionally, and we can only attribute
their giving decisions to ideology.62  Other foundations are still subject
to the influences of their founders, and therefore subject to the rent-
seeking behavior of those founders.
It is impossible to discern the actual motives of founders or foun-
dation managers, but the potential for rent-seeking behavior is there.
Adler suggests one example—the Surdna Foundation, founded by the
Andrus family in 1917.
The foundation, which owns about 75,000 acres of private timber-
land in Northern California and earned $2.7 million in timber in-
come in 1992-93, gains benefits from federal restrictions on timber
harvesting on public lands in the Pacific Northwest, a consequence
of listing the Northern Spotted Owl as endangered.  Since 1989
Surdna has supported the Wilderness Society, National Audubon
Society, Western Ancient Forests Campaign, Oregon Natural Re-
sources Council, and Americans for the Ancient Forest.  Each of
these groups support restrictions on timber harvests on federal
lands. Whether deliberate or not, Surdna’s contributions to efforts
aimed at stopping timber harvesting on public lands increase the
value of private timber, to the benefit of Surdna and Andrus timber
holdings.63
The coalition of foundations supports at least two entities that could
serve as cartel enforcers for environmental organizations.  The first is
the Green Group, formerly known as the Group of Ten.  This group
was created by the Kendall Foundation and others in an effort to en-
courage cooperation among environmental organizations.64  The sec-
ond is the Environmental Grantmakers Association, founded in 1987
by the Rockefeller Family Fund with the purpose of “develop[ing]
collaboration among active and potential members” and “increas[ing]
the resources available to address environmental concerns.”65  “As
often the sole source of funds for broad public outreach, grantmaking
becomes the focal point for inter-organizational cooperation,” a rep-
resentative of one prominent foundation explained.66
61. For a discussion of foundation funding and its impact on environmental organizations,
see ADLER, supra note 40, at 85-107.
62. The Pew Charitable Trusts, created by the children of free enterpriser Joseph Pew, now
have managers who have departed from the founder’s principles.  The trusts are apparently
managed with attention to the ideology of the managers and little else.  See id. at 98.
63. Id.
64. See id. at 94.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 93 (quoting Joshua Reichert of the Pew Charitable Trusts).
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Whether or not it was the intent of Congress, it seems clear that
citizen suits do create financial incentives for extensive litigation and
for cooperation and collusion among environmental advocacy groups.
As the next section demonstrates, if the ability to file these suits is
also disproportionately held by environmental groups, then they have
power over the court’s agenda and thus over the evolution of law.
III.  SETTING THE AGENDA FOR COURT ACTION
No society, whether barbarous or civilized, has ever found it con-
venient to settle the rules of precedency of rank and subordination,
according to those invisible qualities; but according to something
that is more plain and palpable.67
Citizen suits give environmental groups disproportionate access
to courts relative to alleged violators.  In general, a party with no le-
gally recognized grievance, and hence no standing, may be displaced
by other parties who have standing.  At a minimum, alleged violators
must pay their own court costs whether they win or lose.  If environ-
mental groups do have disproportionate access, they in effect set the
agenda for Court deliberation.  Special interest groups that have
standing may choose when and how to bring suits that are likely to
result in decisions favorable to their members.68  Groups with no
standing, especially the population at large, will be referred to the
legislature for relief.
The long-run impact of broad standing rules is to steer the evolu-
tion of both environmental law and property rights to the benefit of
groups who can set the agenda.  Flick and Dunn show, for example,
that different standing requirements can have a significant effect on
forest policy.69
If only one set of persons—those interested in protecting endan-
gered species—have [sic] access to the courts, while their policy
competitors with commercial interests are forced to petition the
legislature, then costs of negotiating, developing, and protecting
property rights is much lower for environmentalists than for their
competitors.  The advantage can be substantial.  Plaintiffs select
cases and issues on which to sue.  Plaintiffs and defendants together
67. SMITH, supra note 1, at 671. 
68. Any individual who can control the agenda of pairwise votes can lead a decision-
making body to any outcome he chooses.  See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II: A
REVISED EDITION OF PUBLIC CHOICE 87-95 (1989).
69. See Warren A. Flick & Michael A. Dunn, Standing to Sue and the Making of Forest
Policy 9 (May 22, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
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decide how far to push each suit. . . .
[I]f only one interest has access to federal courts, over time the
law favoring that interest will become more fully developed and
well specified, which should help ensure production of the goods
and services consistent with that interest. . . .
Differential standing requirements are barriers to entry into the
“market” (courts) for the production and exchange of rights.70
In a pair of articles, Stearns explains the rationale for standing as
a complement to the stare decisis doctrine.71  Given judges’ prefer-
ences, their decisions can be modeled as strategic game-playing.  If
those preferences are multipeaked, cycling can be a problem.72  Vote
trading can potentially resolve cycling by changing ordinal prefer-
ences into cardinal preferences, but the institutions of federal courts
discourage vote trading.73  Stare decisis, Stearns explains, prevents un-
desirable cycling in judicial decisions by adding a deliberate path de-
pendence to case law.  Stare decisis can thereby prevent cycling and
add rationality and continuity to case law, yet there remains an incen-
tive among interest groups to manipulate the order in which cases are
heard.  Restrictions on standing may preserve the fairness of this or-
der.74  Stearns addresses neither the rent-seeking implications of
70. Id.  The last sentence in the quoted passage is misleading, however.  First, the courts
can in no way be classified as a market; markets are characterized by pricing and voluntary pro-
duction and exchange, which do not exist in courts.  Second, property rights are not produced;
they have always existed in someone’s bundle, though perhaps unnoticed and uncontested (i.e.
marginally irrelevant).  They may only be sold, traded, or taken forcibly.  The “production” of
rights that Flick and Dunn mention may be more accurately described as the unbundling of
rights.
71. See Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social Choice,
83 CAL. L. REV. 1309 (1995) [hereinafter Stearns, Standing Back From the Forest]; Maxwell L.
Stearns, Standing and Social Choice: Historical Evidence, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 309 (1995) [here-
inafter Stearns, Standing and Social Choice].
72. In the game theoretic context, cycling occurs when there is no Nash equilibrium among
three or more players.  The sequence of the decision—the agenda or the docket—may then be
used to manipulate outcomes.  Politically and legally, this causes arbitrariness, a problem first
recognized by the Marquis de Condorcet in 1785.  Kenneth Arrow unwittingly generalized de
Condorcet’s work.  See Stearns, Standing Back From the Forest, supra note 71, at 1329; see also
MUELLER, supra note 68, at 63-65; Maxwell L. Stearns, The Misguided Renaissance of Social
Choice, 103 YALE L.J. 1219 (1994).
73. Stearns argues that the custom of publishing opinions imposes a reputational cost on
judges who write opinions inconsistent with their previous statements.  Judges must therefore
engage in principled voting.  See Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest, supra note 71, at 1376.
74. For more applications of voting paradoxes to courts, see generally Frank H. Easter-
brook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802 (1982); Lewis A. Kornhauser &
Lawrence Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82 (1986); Matthew L. Spitzer, Multicriteria
Choice Processes: An Application of Public Choice Theory to Bakke, the FCC, and the Courts,
88 YALE L.J. 717 (1979).
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standing nor the unique treatment of standing in environmental cases,
but his conclusions clearly support a theme of this paper—that liber-
alized standing makes rent-seeking less costly to rent-seekers.  The
prevailing concern of this paper is not the origin of standing or its ef-
ficiency-inducing, decision-stabilizing function, but rather the wealth
transfers that may result from changes in standing.
IV.  CITIZEN SUITS AND RAISING RIVALS’ COSTS
Country gentlemen and farmers are, to their great honour, of all
people, the least subject to the wretched spirit of monopoly.75
A. Regulation, Standing, and Rent Seeking
Environmental groups are not the only ones to use environ-
mental law to serve their interests.  Rival business groups can use it as
well.  It has been demonstrated that a polluting industry can (and
does) use environmental regulation to raise rivals’ costs, perhaps form
a legal cartel to restrict entry, and enjoy monopoly rents.76  While
economists can make assertions about what approach to regulation
would be most efficient, or welfare-maximizing for society as a whole,
political outcomes more often reflect the values of special interests
and political wealth-brokers.77  Here the rent-seeking approach is
helpful.  Special interest groups seeking rents may be able to influ-
ence the rule-making and rule-interpreting process in order to gain
supra-normal profits for themselves.  Public interest goals, such as a
cleaner environment, may be sacrificed for the sake of special interest
goals.78
75. SMITH, supra note 1, at 428. 
76. See, e.g., Michael T. Maloney & Robert E. McCormick, A Positive Theory of Environ-
mental Quality Regulation, 25 J.L. & ECON. 99, 100 (1982).
77. On regulatory outcomes, Maloney and McCormick write:
The maze of environmental quality regulation is overwhelming and bears little resem-
blance to the efficiency criteria proposed in the economics literature.  Many regulatory
techniques—such as technology-specific regulations, differential standards for old ver-
sus new firms, uniform percentage reductions across pollution sources, and the inal-
ienability of pollution permits—are hard to understand on the surface.  Some of the
confusion is the result of only focusing on the externality effects of air and water pollu-
tion and ignoring the effects of price changes on the regulated industry.
Id.
78. For applications of this theory to environmental regulation see generally BRUCE
YANDLE, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: CREATING WEALTH
IN HUMMINGBIRD ECONOMIES (1997); James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, Polluters’ Prof-
its and Political Response: Direct Controls Versus Taxes, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 139 (1975); Ma-
loney & McCormick, supra note 76; David W. Riggs, Acid Rain and the Clean Air Act: Lessons
in Damage Control, in TAKING THE ENVIRONMENT SERIOUSLY (Roger Meiners & Bruce Yan-
dle eds., 1993); Richard L. Stroup & Jane S. Shaw, Environmental Harms from Federal Gov-
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The rent-seeking or special interest approach is often applied to
regulation, but applications to standing have been rare.  Our ap-
proach searches for the winners and losers created by various stand-
ing rules, and attempts to determine if the winners are using standing
rules to gain monopoly rents.
If standing is denied to one group and given to another, it may be
that command and control regulation is more likely to result because
market-based systems of regulation (e.g. marketable permits) do not
work as well for wealth transfers.79  Competitive markets do not gen-
erate artificial output or price restrictions in the way that command
and control regulation does.  Any environmental regulation that re-
lies upon competitive markets for the allocation of property rights in
an environmental resource will enjoy efficiencies not found in com-
mand and control regulation.80
Buchanan and Tullock lend support to the view that command
and control regulation is more suitable to wealth transfers than some
other pollution reduction schemes (specifically, emissions taxes).81
Command and control regulation produces an output restriction,
which leads to price increases enjoyed by firms in the regulated indus-
try.82  Existing firms may be exempt from certain requirements due to
grandfather clauses, or they at least may be able to better absorb the
cost of regulation than marginal competitors.83  Command and con-
trol, technology-based regulation is thus a cartelizing influence on in-
dustry, resulting in economic rents for the regulated.
[U]nder regulation firms may well secure pecuniary gains from the
imposition of direct controls that reduce total industry output.  To
the extent that the restriction is achieved by the assignment of pro-
duction quotas to existing firms, net profits may be present even for
the short term and are more likely to arise after adjustments in
ernment Policy, in TAKING THE ENVIRONMENT SERIOUSLY, supra.
79. See Buchanan & Tullock, supra note 78, at 142.
80. See, e.g., William O’Neil et al., Transferable Discharge Permits and Economic Effi-
ciency: The Fox River, 10 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 346 (1983); Robert W. Hahn, Economic
Prescriptions for Environmental Problems: How the Patient Followed the Doctor’s Orders, 3 J.
ECON. PERSP. 95 (1989).
81. See Buchanan & Tullock, supra note 78, at 142.
82. See Maloney and McCormick, supra note 76, at 112, 120.  Maloney and McCormick
found that the final announcement of emission rules that affected the U.S. copper industry
boosted the stock prices of major firms in the industry.  It is of interest that the EPA had indi-
cated before the announcement that, if the rules were made final, there would never be another
copper smelter built in the United States.  Maloney and McCormick found similar increases in
stock prices of textile firms after the promulgation of an Occupational Safety and Health Ad-
ministration cotton dust standard.
83. See id. at 101.
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plant.  In effect, regulation in this sense is the directional equivalent
of cartel formation provided that the individual firm’s assigned
quota falls within the limited range over which average cost falls
below price.84
Regulation not only corrects a resource misallocation, but it cre-
ates a scarcity rent as well.  In the recent history of environmental
quality, the common access problem has been addressed by federal
and state agencies through a standards-based approach, rather than
through the enforcement of tradable property rights.  As a conse-
quence, rents from the right to use these assets have accrued to
producers.85
The Achilles heel of all cartels is usually the lack of enforce-
ment—the ability to punish cartel members that produce more than
their assigned quota and to keep would-be competitors out of the in-
dustry.  Under liberalized standing rules, the cartel of environmental
advocacy groups helps enforce the industrial cartels.  As we discussed
above, payoffs to the enforcers come in multiple forms, notably
above-cost reimbursements of attorneys’ fees and so-called “credit
projects,” or payments to environmental advocacy groups as part of
settlements.
Yandle emphasizes the decentralized aspect of common law as a
natural guard against rent seeking:
At common law, a party damaged by a polluting firm may bring an
action against the polluter.  If damages are proven and evidence
linking the damage to the polluter is demonstrated, the court can
award damages and/or grant an injunction stopping the pollution.
The court cannot impose an award for damages on an entire indus-
try or issue an industry-wide or nationwide injunction.  There is no
way for an industry to gain from a common-law action.  Dischargers
that comply with common-law rules may gain briefly, however,
when scofflaws are brought to justice.  But any gains that play
across a competitive industry will soon be dissipated by competitive
expansion of clean output.  Can a discharger gain an advantage by
attracting a common-law suit?  Hardly.  And can an industry lobby
every common-law judge in the country and gain some special
treatment by the courts?  It is unimaginable.  Simply put, common-
law remedies encourage firms to avoid imposing real harm on the
actual receivers of pollution, and punish those firms that do not.86
Traditional standing rules required proving the harm and tying
the harm suffered by the plaintiff to the actions of the defendant.87
84. Buchanan & Tullock, supra note 78, at 142.
85. Maloney & McCormick, supra note 76, at 99.
86. YANDLE, supra note 78, at 66.
87. Justice Brandeis, in a concurring opinion in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority,
297 U.S. 288, 346-348 (1936), wrote, “The Court developed, for its own governance in the cases
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Early in the history of cartelizing regulation, standing rules permitted
lawsuits “by members of the regulated industries but not by outsiders
and members of the public”88  As regulation grew to encompass all
industries and cartels grew in strength, these barriers fell.89  Harm-
based standing rules no longer applied, and everyone gained standing
through citizen suit provisions in statutory law.90
Market-based systems give everyone standing, in a sense.  With a
market-based system it may be impossible to appropriate others’
property through the courts.91  No output restriction is generated, and
no artificial price increases are produced.  For market-based regula-
tory systems such as emission fees, performance standards, and trad-
able pollution permits, Yandle writes, output limitation and cartel
confessedly within its jurisdiction, a series of rules under which it has avoided passing upon a
large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision.”  In part, the rules
state,
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who
fails to show that he is injured by its operation. . . .Among the many applications of this
rule, none is more striking than the denial of the right of challenge to one who lacks a
personal or property right. . . .
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one
who has availed himself of its benefits. . . .
Id. at 347-348 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (emphasis added).  See also Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982);
CRAIG R. DUCAT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 69-70 (6th ed. 1996); Peter A. Alpert,
Citizen Suits under the Clean Air Act: Universal Standing for the Uninjured Private Attorney
General?, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 283, 288 (1988).
88. DUCAT, supra note 87, at 68.
89. See, e.g., Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm’n, 354 F.2d
608, 615-16 (2d Cir. 1965).
90. See Michael J. Walker & Jon D. Jacobs, EPCRA Citizens Suits: An Evolving Opus with
a Discordant Note, 7 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 15 (Jan./Feb. 1997) (on file with authors).  Environ-
mental groups may sometimes be granted standing in their own behalf.  Walker and Jacobs
note:
In Delaware Valley Toxics Coalition v. Kurz-Hastings, 813 F. Supp. 1132 (E.D. Pa.
1993), the Delaware Valley Toxics Coalition (DVTC) undertook a computer study to
determine if any local companies failed to submit required EPCRA reports.  This
study required the DVTC to purchase certain items and incur at least 250 hours of staff
time.  This expenditure of time reduced the availability of staff to perform its primary
function, that is, disseminating information to educate and train others.  The court
found that this constituted injury in fact, fairly traceable to the defendant’s actions (or
lack of), and likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.
Id.
91. In certain situations, rent-seeking may actually have positive consequences.  If special-
ized knowledge has been developed in the manufacture of a more efficient pollution reduction
device, for instance, or if a patent has been obtained in a more efficient machine, then appeals
to the state to rescind command-and-control regulations in favor of a market-based system may:
(1) satisfy the definition of rent-seeking, and (2) have positive (welfare-enhancing) conse-
quences.  Any positive price is all rent, once the knowledge has been produced.  Admittedly,
this is an unusual application of the term “rent-seeking,” but it is technically consistent with the
definition commonly used by economists.
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profits are temporary at best:
Assume the same level of pollution reduction is mandated, but the
industry is told it can accomplish the reduction in any way it de-
sires, just so long as the environment is protected.  Firms that dis-
cover new ways to reduce pollution can do so.  Competition among
firms pushes toward improved, lower-cost environmental manage-
ment.  Those that find better approaches can expand, relative to
firms that are less successful.  Ultimately, the industry will achieve
the reduction, but entry and exit will not be blocked.  Any extra
profits made along the way will be temporary.92
B. Standing, Bootleggers, and Baptists
It is useful to consider all the parties involved in applying pres-
sure to change standing requirements.  As we know, those favoring
citizen-suit provisions include not only industries with an interest in
cartelization, but also environmentalists or victims of pollution who
have preferences for a cleaner or less developed world.
“[E]nvironmental regulation, that is, regulation of a competitive in-
dustry in a negative externality setting, carries with it the implication
that producers and the victims of pollution may find it in their self-
interest to form a like-minded coalition to lobby for input restrictions
and/or output reductions.”93
Yandle explains how one of these groups can use the arguments
of the other to achieve different objectives.94  Common interests be-
tween groups as unlike as bootleggers and Baptists can lead to odd
partnerships in political lobbying.  The bootleggers desire the closing
of their competition—liquor stores—in the interest of higher profits.
The Baptists favor restrictions on the sale of alcohol for moral rea-
sons.  Both may favor a ban on Sunday liquor sales.  Bootleggers,
rather than arguing that an output restriction would transfer wealth in
their direction, garner support for Sunday alcohol bans by using the
moral reasoning of the Baptists.
The Baptists bring something to the anticompetitive effort that
cannot be delivered by bootleggers.  They add public interest con-
tent to what otherwise would be a strictly private venture.  The
Baptist element, which I ask you to think of as a generic term, adds
a moral ring to what might otherwise be viewed as an immoral ef-
fort, the passing of money (and electability) to politicians to obtain
a political favor.95
92. YANDLE, supra note 78, at 66.
93. Maloney & McCormick, supra note 76, at 100.
94. See YANDLE, supra note 78.
95. Id. at 70.
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The “bootleggers” with whom we are presently concerned are
the industries interested in output limitation.  The “Baptists” are the
environmental advocacy groups.  Both entities benefit from coopera-
tion.96  Firms interested in raising their rivals’ costs have found that
contributing to environmental groups is one of the most effective
ways of accomplishing that end.
In regulatory episodes that are controversial, there is an incentive
for the rent-seeking bootleggers to subsidize the actions of the pub-
lic-interest Baptists.  The subsidy would provide an indirect moral
avenue for rent-seeking behavior, thereby lowering the political
costs of supporting the regulation.  Interdependent interest groups
with the same means to different ends creates the potential for
cross subsidization; increasing the difficulty of distinguishing rent-
seeking from the public interest motive.97
Examples of industry-environmentalist cooperation are numer-
ous.  Blakeman Early of the Sierra Club stated forthrightly that “[t]he
commercial waste industry has an interest in improving regulations
sufficiently to drive mom-and-pop operations out of business.”98  Ad-
ler notes that WMX (now Waste Management, Inc.), the largest waste
management company in the United States, “has funded the National
Audubon Society, National Wildlife Federation, Natural Resources
Defense Council, Wilderness Society, and World Resources Institute,
typically giving over $700,000 annually to environmental causes.”99  A
former director of environmental affairs for WMX, William Y.
Brown, who also served as acting director of the Environmental De-
fense Fund, acknowledged, “[w]e’re in a position to benefit from the
same objectives that [environmental groups] are pursuing. . . .  Stricter
legislation is environmentally good and it also helps our business.”100
Yandle explains the advantage presented to the environmental
advocacy groups from a movement toward statutory law and unlim-
ited standing to sue:
The environmental statutes offered another attractive feature for
environmentalists who could not make a valid claim of damages in
a common-law court, but who nonetheless felt driven to correct
perceived environmental harms.  Under the statutes, any citizen
could file an administrative complaint, which merely had to show
96. However, we have shown that the interest of the “Baptist” environmentalists may be
partially pecuniary.  See supra Part I.
97. Jason F. Shogren, The Optimal Subsidization of Baptists by Bootleggers, 67 PUB.
CHOICE 181, 182 (1990).
98. ADLER, supra note 40, at 97.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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an infraction of rules created by statute, and seek access to a fed-
eral court.  Under federal statutes, infractions of federal rules
automatically contain a federal question.  The old common-law re-
quirements of standing and demonstration of damages were not re-
quired.  In effect, the statute law of the 1970s made every U.S. citi-
zen an environmental deputy.101
The “bootlegger” interest groups will tend to support this deputi-
zation because it adds to the power of their co-belligerents.  Any en-
vironmental legislation that contributes to output limitation and the
cartelization of industry will be more strictly enforced under citizen-
suit provisions.
One citizen suit brought against a Pennsylvania cement kiln
company illustrates how liberalized standing can be used to raise ri-
vals’ costs.102  Cement manufacturing entails the use of a large amount
of energy, and about 25 cement kilns in the United States use hazard-
ous waste-derived fuels (HWDFs) as a remunerative partial substitute
for coal.103  Because hazardous wastes can be disposed of in cement
kilns while meeting federal emissions regulations, cement manufac-
turers can receive substantial revenue from burning this waste.104  The
Keystone Cement Co., of Bath, Pennsylvania, received about 15% of
its 1995 revenues from HWDF use.105
In September 1995, Pennsylvania Environmental Enforcement
Project (PEEP), a local citizens’ group based in the Bath area, filed
suit against Keystone under the citizen-suit provision of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).106  PEEP alleged that Key-
stone had violated RCRA as well as the Clean Air Act and the
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act.107  Calling
the cement kiln an “imminent” threat to area residents, PEEP sought
to enjoin Keystone from burning hazardous waste in its kilns.108
The RCRA of 1976 gave birth to a strictly regulated hazardous
101. YANDLE, supra note 78, at 108.
102. See Pennsylvania Envtl. Enforcement Project, Inc. v. Keystone Cement Co., C.A. No.
95-5869 (E.D. Pa. filed Sept. 1995).
103. See Bruce Rubenstein, Outraged Citizens or Public Relations Ploy?  Shills Front for
Corporation in Pennsylvania, 6 CORP. LEGAL TIMES 1 (Dec. 1996).
104. See id. at 25-26.
105. See SCOTT H. SEGAL, THE WOLF IN SHEEP’S CLOTHING: THE MISUSE OF CITIZENS
SUITS BY ECONOMIC COMPETITORS 2 (1997).
106. See Keystone Cement Co., C.A. No. 95-5869.
107. See Lori Tripoli, Think Globally, Sue Locally: Uncovering the Citizen Front, 10 INSIDE
LITIG. 1, 2 (Nov. 1996).
108. See Rubenstein, supra note 103, at 26.
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waste incineration industry.109  U.S. industry produces about 250 mil-
lion tons of hazardous waste annually, and with incinerators charging
hundreds of dollars per ton destroyed, the incineration industry
rapidly expanded.110  In the 1980s, the cement industry started burning
liquid hazardous waste in its kilns, taking some of the market share
away from the incinerators.  While incinerators charged $284 per ton
to burn liquid waste, cement kilns charged only $100 per ton (in
1990).111  The cement kiln’s cost advantage over incinerators grew
more pronounced once new technology allowed kilns to burn solid
waste as well.112  Over 60 percent of the incinerator industry’s market
had been captured by cement kilns by 1991.113
Understandably, this competition provoked a hostile reaction
from the incinerator industry, which formed the Association for Re-
sponsible Thermal Treatment (ARTT) in December of 1993.114  The
stated purpose of the association was “to advocate that combustion of
hazardous waste be done using the most advanced technology possi-
ble and under the most stringent standards.”115  Since then, both in-
dustries have been engaged in a lobbying and public relations battle
to tilt environmental regulation in their favor.116
The Keystone Cement Co. case demonstrates how citizen-suit
provisions provide another avenue for firms to raise rivals’ costs and
gain rents.  PEEP, which was incorporated only weeks before the suit
was filed, was found to have been heavily supported by one of Key-
stone’s competitors—a hazardous waste incinerator.  Within eight
months’ time, PEEP received at least $250,000 from Rollins Envi-
ronmental Services, an incinerator and one of three members of the
ARTT.117  A PEEP representative testified that, unlike its parent en-
vironmental organization, PEEP did not oppose all hazardous waste
109. See James T. Bennett, Selling its Reputation: The American Lung Association, in
ALTERNATIVES IN PHILANTHROPY 1 (1995).
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See Rubenstein, supra note 103, at 26.
113. See id.
114. See Bennett, supra note 109.
115. Tripoli, supra note 107, at 4.
116. See, e.g., Rubenstein, supra note 103; Jeff Bailey, Waste Firms to Petition EPA to Ban
Hazardous-Material Burning at Kilns, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 1994, at B5A; Cathleen Cole, Texas
Lung Association Enters Fray Between Cement and Incinerator Industries, TEX. ENVTL. NEWS
12 (Oct. 1994).
117. See Rubenstein, supra note 103, at 26.
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incineration, but only that which occurred in cement kilns.118  After
the suit was settled, PEEP dissolved.
Initially, Rollins denied association with PEEP, but a later ad-
mission by a Rollins spokesperson and court-released documents
proved the connection.119  Furthermore, the documents clearly show
an effort by Rollins to raise the costs of cement kiln rivals.  For exam-
ple, one Rollins memo lists the cement kilns “most vulnerable” to ad-
ditional regulation, noting: “Kilns or companies with the smallest
waste rates should be the most vulnerable. . . .  For these kilns the cost
of regulatory and compliance efforts would be a higher percentage of
waste revenues.  Any additional costs would ‘have a smaller denomi-
nator’ in affecting the cost per pound burned.”120  In other words, en-
forced regulation would raise average costs at marginal kilns by a
higher percentage than at kilns that used a larger proportion of haz-
ardous waste.
Christopher Marraro, Keystone’s attorney, commented that the
PEEP citizen suit was part of “a strategy put forth by commercial
hazardous waste incinerators, or at least by a sub-group, to use citizen
groups to bring lawsuits for the purpose of trying to achieve some-
thing they’ve failed to achieve in administrative or legislative fo-
rums—to shut cement kilns out of the hazardous waste market.”121
Certainly the Keystone case is not an isolated example.  A Mid-
lothian, Texas cement kiln has been engaged in a similar battle with
citizen groups who have received substantial support from incinera-
tors.122  In Michigan, the Huron Environmental Activist League
118. See id. at 27; Tripoli, supra note 107, at 3.
119. See Rubenstein, supra note 103, at 27.
120. Memorandum from Charles Lamb to Phil Retallick, Cement Kiln Strategy (Nov. 17,
1995)(on file with authors).
121. Tripoli, supra note 107, at 3.
122. Though the defendants cannot prove that the incinerator group initiated the lawsuit,
“Downwinders at Risk,” a citizen group, has received airline fares, copiers, reimbursement of
phone expenditures, and other donations from the ARTT.  The American Lung Association
(ALA) has used a $46,000 grant from the ARTT for funding the prosecution, a grant which the
ARTT specified had to be used against cement kilns in Texas.  See Letters from Harold Green,
TXI Director of Corporate Communications (on file with authors)  Shortly after the founding of
ARTT in 1993, it made an initial $150,000 donation to the ALA, which has been followed by
other donations such as the one mentioned above.  The Cement Kiln Recycling Coalition has
argued that the donations have been used in a multi-state campaign “focused exclusively on
attacking cement kilns that burn waste. No such ALA programs have been aimed at commercial
incinerators.”  Press Release from Cement Kiln Recycling Coalition, Cement Group Calls for
Investigation of American Lung Association (January 26, 1995) (on file with authors).  For more
on the ARTT-ALA connection, see Bennett, supra note 109; YANDLE, supra note 78, at 71-72
(mentioning briefly various cooperative efforts between hazardous waste incinerators and envi-
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(HEAL) filed a citizen suit against Lafarge, another hazardous waste-
burning cement company.123  The Lafarge Vice President of Environ-
mental Affairs suspects that their competitors are funding the opposi-
tion in an effort to raise Lafarge’s costs.  He stated, “[w]e suspected
they may be getting some funding provided by the ARTT to the
American Lung Association and then to HEAL.”124
The use of citizen suits to rent-seek is not confined to the cement
kiln industry.  Northrup and White find that construction unions have
used a wide variety of strategies, including citizen suits, to impose
costs on non-union contractors.125  Unions have typically begun their
intervention in the construction permitting process
by claiming that the user’s application does not protect sufficiently
the air or water quality, that drainage or waste disposal plans are
insufficient, or that the construction plan violates other environ-
mental regulations.  The union posture may be supported by envi-
ronmental groups and by “consumer groups” that spring up and
likely are controlled or funded by unions. . . .  Often. . .the union ac-
tion seems more designed to inflict costs on the users than to pro-
tect the environment.126
Northrup and White provide multiple examples of union uses of
suits against electric utilities and oil and gas companies.  One such
case, filed under the Clean Water Act, is Labor for the Public Interest
v. Union Oil.127  Labor for the Public Interest sought an injunction
against Union Oil’s alleged pollution of San Pablo Bay, in addition to
up to $25,000 in civil penalties for each violation.128
Insofar as industries benefit from cartelizing environmental rules,
industries will be assisted by citizen-suit provisions.  But Greve writes,
[C]artels do need barriers, both to protect against outsiders and to
police relations among the interests within.  The purpose of the
regulatory arrangement thus entailed, first, a natural stopping
point: regulation went only so far as to protect its intended benefi-
ciaries—the members of the cartel—from harmful effects. . . .  The
cartel nature of regulation entailed, second, standing rules that permit
ronmental groups).
123. See Huron Envtl. Activist League v. Harding, No. 95-81890-CE (Mich. Cir. Ct. Ingham
County filed Dec. 1, 1995).
124. Tripoli, supra note 107, at 4.
125. See generally Herbert R. Northrup & Augustus T. White, Construction Union Use of
Environmental Regulation to Win Jobs: Cases, Impact, and Legal Challenges, 19 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 55 (1995).
126. Id. at 61, 62.
127. No. C92-2531 (N.D. Cal. filed Nov. 19, 1993).
128. See Northrup & White, supra note 125, at 81.
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lawsuits by members of the regulated industries. . . but not by outsid-
ers and members of the public…129
Greve argues that conservative standing rules support the cartels
of regulated industries. Yet if liberalized standing increases the en-
forcement of cartelizing regulations, then liberalized standing rules
for environmental groups, not conservative standing rules, support
industrial cartels. Greve has the relationship exactly backwards. As
federal courts moved toward more conservative standing rules in the
1990s, the enforcement mechanism for the industrial cartels was seri-
ously damaged.
C. Laidlaw and Industrial Rent-Seekers
The Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation130 and Lujan v. De-
fenders of Wildlife131 cases, followed by Steel Company v. Citizens for
a Better Environment132 and Bennett v. Spear,133 signaled a shift in the
Supreme Court away from the liberalized standing requirements of
the 1970s and 1980s.  As standing was made more difficult for envi-
ronmental interest groups to obtain, many industries were threatened
with loss of rents as the enforcement program for cartelizing regula-
tion was deprived of a key component.  Anything that works to de-
crease enforcement endangers industrial cartels.  Though not a sub-
scriber to the rent-seeking idea, Mintz comments that a particular pe-
riod of lower enforcement at EPA was not viewed favorably by some
firms: “EPA’s weakened enforcement effort also met with increasing
disenchantment from some elements of industry.  During this period,
a number of regulated firms became concerned that the decline in
EPA enforcement was contrary to their interests.”134
The Court’s decision in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw En-
vironmental Services, Inc.135 marks a return to less stringent standing
requirements and could reintroduce more effective regulation, with a
corresponding reinforcement of industrial cartels.
129. MICHAEL S. GREVE, THE DEMISE OF ENVIRONMENTALISM IN AMERICAN LAW 10
(1996) (emphasis added).
130. 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
131. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
132. 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
133. 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
134. JOEL A. MINTZ, ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA: HIGH STAKES AND HARD CHOICES 50-
51 (1995).
135. See 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
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V.  THE MAJORITARIAN RATIONALE FOR
CITIZEN-SUIT PROVISIONS
That it was the spirit of monopoly which originally both invented
and propagated this doctrine, cannot be doubted; and they who first
taught it were by no means such fools as they who believed it.136
In defense of more liberal standing rules for environmental plain-
tiffs, some authors have argued that, due to the free-rider problem
and high transactions costs, majoritarian environmental preferences
are underrepresented in the American political process relative to the
narrow interests of the business community.137  Preferential treatment
for environmental plaintiffs is therefore seen as necessary to level the
playing field.  Such arguments are based on questionable assumptions
and a rather naïve characterization of the economics of collective ac-
tion.
Perhaps the single most questionable of these implicit assump-
tions is that environmental interest groups, or citizens acting indi-
vidually to achieve environmental goals, represent the preferences of
the public at large.  Environmental actions are costly.  Because re-
sources are scarce, those used to improve environmental quality are
not available to produce food, housing, and the other goods and
services that people value.  Hence, the assertion that the preferences
of environmental groups express majoritarian preferences implies
that the majority of citizens are willing to pay higher prices and ab-
sorb reduced standards of living to enjoy more environmental quality.
Furthermore, it implies that the majority of citizens are also in
agreement with environmental groups as to the extent of any resource
reallocation that may be desired.
While environmental advocacy groups may reflect true majori-
tarian views on some environmental issues, the blanket application of
this proposition to all issues is questionable for several reasons.  First,
the premise itself is simply speculation, generally unsupported by
documented evidence or logic.138
136. SMITH, supra note 1, at 461.
137. For example, in his discussion of the issue, John Echeverria, author of a Brief filed in
support of the petitioners in Laidlaw, asserts that the Court erred in many of its rulings during
the last decade because its failure to recognize that, because of the free-rider problem, “majori-
tarian interest in environmental protection” is underrepresented in the political process.  See
Brief Amicus Curiae of Americans for the Environment in Support of Petitioners at 1, Friends
of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) (No. 98-822).
138. For example, implicit in Echeverria’s apt description of the free rider is the assumption
that the environmental organizations pushing for certain environmental action are producing a
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Second, even if environmental interest groups do reflect majori-
tarian views, those views may reflect a lack of information more than
informed preferences.  The trade-off between environmental im-
provements and prices, employment, and other indicators of eco-
nomic well-being is not generally well known.139  While damages from
pollution, and hence the benefits of environmental controls, are
highly publicized, the individual sacrifice in material well-being re-
quired to achieve specific environmental improvements is not well
publicized.  Indeed, it is in the interest of environmental interest
groups and enforcement agencies to exaggerate damages from pollu-
tion.  By doing so interest groups improve their chances of attracting
members and contributions, and enforcement agencies improve their
chances of larger budgets and increased political influence.140  For ex-
ample, as documented in the National Acid Precipitation Assessment
Program, widely reported damages from acid deposition prior to 1990
were wildly exaggerated.141  Importantly, these exaggerated damages
public good.  See id. at 5.
Even among a majority that agrees that clean air or clean water or a greater variety of
healthy animal populations is a desirable goal, there might be considerable disagreement with
the environmental organizations over the effectiveness or efficiency of the means toward those
ends.  A particular citizen suit or lobbying effort, then, might be viewed by the majority as a
public bad.  In addition, because the production of any public good requires sacrificing re-
sources that would otherwise be used in the production of other goods and services, it is not at
all clear that the trade-offs acceptable to the environmental advocacy group are even approxi-
mately consistent with the trade-offs the majority would make to acquire that public good.
139. A major obstacle to assessing the cost of public goods and jointly consumed external-
ities, like pollution, is that little market information is available from which the true preferences
of individuals can be deduced.  Further, when asked to reveal preferences, individuals have
incentive to strategically misstate their true evaluations.  A substantial literature has been pro-
duced in which authors propose decision-making “mechanisms” to overcome this problem.  See,
e.g., A.H. Barnett, Soliciting Accurate Evaluations of Public Goods, 9 PUB. FIN. Q. 221 (1981);
Peter Bohm, An Approach to the Problem of Estimating Demand for Public Goods, 73 SWEDISH
J. ECON. 55 (1971); James M. Buchanan, The Institutional Structure of Externality, 14 PUB.
CHOICE 69 (1973); Edward H. Clarke, Multipart Pricing of Public Goods, 11 PUB. CHOICE 17
(1971); J.H. Dreze & D. de la Vallee Poussin, A Tatonement Process for Public Goods, 38 REV.
ECON. STUD. (1971); E.A. Thompson, A Pareto Optimal Group Decision Process, 1 PAPERS ON
NON-MARKET DECISION MAKING 133 (1965); T. Nicolaus Tideman & Gordon Tullock, A New
and Superior Process for Making Social Choices, 84 J. POL. ECON. 1145 (1976).
140. For a detailed discussion of interest group politics, see ROBERT E. MCCORMICK &
ROBERT D. TOLLISON, POLITICIANS, LEGISLATION, AND THE ECONOMY (1981).
141. The National Acid Precipitation Assessment Project was a decade-long study funded
by Congress at $570 million, that employed several thousand of the world’s top environmental
scientists.  The study is remarkable both because of its finding that acid precipitation damages
were dramatically overstated by the popular press and because the study was essentially buried
by the EPA because its results were not consistent with an activist policy of control for acid
forming gases.  See NATIONAL ACID PRECIPITATION ASSESSMENT PROGRAM, ANNUAL
REPORT (1988); NATIONAL ACID PRECIPITATION ASSESSMENT PROGRAM, ANNUAL REPORT
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played an important role in the controls on acid forming gases that
were incorporated into the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments.
Further, it is likely that where costs are recognized they are per-
ceived as being borne by producers142 instead of consumers and em-
ployees.143  Casual observation suggests that the general population
does not fully perceive the specifics of how these costs are reflected in
reduced individual well being.  As a consequence, there would appear
to be a systematic bias in perceptions of citizens at large in assessing
the benefits and costs of environmental controls.  Specifically, it is
likely that benefits are overestimated relative to costs.
This bias may, in part, explain the political popularity of envi-
ronmental legislation.  Since 1970, this popularity has produced a
stream of increasingly restrictive environmental legislation.  With
each amendment, the Clear Air and Clean Water Acts have become
more restrictive.  Indeed, additional environmental regulation has
joined support for veterans, Social Security, and the family farm on
the list of things that successful politicians find very difficult to op-
pose.  To the extent that political rhetoric and campaign positions re-
flect actual political agendas, the assertion that free-rider problems
and high transaction costs cause under-representation of environ-
mental interests is highly suspect.
Third, the implication that the community of polluters is unani-
mous in its opposition to environmental controls is misguided.  In
fact, environmental laws (including citizen-suit provisions) can be
used by some firms to construct entry barriers and raise rivals’ costs.144
As a consequence, opposition to controls by those who represent rival
business interests, and indirectly the interest of consumers, may be
(1989); NATIONAL ACID PRECIPITATION ASSESSMENT PROJECT, REPORT TO CONGRESS
(1992). For a discussion of the general tendency of environmentalists and journalists to greatly
exaggerate (or even fabricate) environmental problems, see JULIAN SIMON, HOODWINKING
THE NATION (1999).
142. This is implied by William W. Buzbee, Standing and the Statutory Universe, 11 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 247 (2001) and Echeverria in his Brief Amicus Curiae of Americans for
the Environment in Support of Petitioners, Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167 (No. 98-822), among others.
143. Buzbee ignores the possibility that the demand curve for a firm’s product might not be
horizontal.  Buzbee states, “The targets of regulation make compliance decisions based on their
sense of obligation to comply with the laws, their evaluation of compliance costs and the likeli-
hood particular conduct will result in sanctionable violations, their evaluation of how pollution
might result in adverse market evaluations or nuisance liability, and their views of how their
workers and neighbors will react to their compliance record.”  Buzbee, supra note 142, at 272.
Nowhere does Buzbee consider the firm’s ability to pass costs on to the consumer.  Because cost
increases may not have impacts exclusively on producers, compliance decisions may be based
upon the elasticity of demand for a firm’s product.
144. See supra Part V.
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diluted by the lobbying efforts of environmental advocacy groups.
Environmental groups that successfully promote adoption of envi-
ronmental legislation are, perhaps unwittingly, acting to benefit a sub-
set of firms that would use the legislation as a mechanism to limit
competition.145
Fourth, both the costs and benefits of enforcement of environ-
mental laws are highly diffuse.  No doubt many citizens are interested
in the quality of their environment, and they may free-ride on the ef-
forts of others in gaining environmental improvements.  However,
they have similar incentives in resisting the excessive enactment or
enforcement of controls that raise prices and marginally reduce their
material well being.  For example, as noted by Echeverria, milk con-
sumers do not mount organized efforts to resist price supports for
milk that serve the interests of milk producers at the expense of
higher prices for consumers.146
In their actions as voters, citizens are subject to “rational voter
ignorance.”147  As a consequence, they have little incentive to become
well informed about the costs and benefits of environmental con-
trols.148  The impacts of environmental controls on environmental
quality and their impacts on the material well-being of individuals are
both diffuse and relatively small for each individual.  As a conse-
quence, individual citizens lack incentive to devote large amounts of
time or money in either becoming informed or promoting change.
Whether individuals perceive over-enforcement or under-
enforcement, they have incentive to free ride.  Further, the same in-
centives that lead to free-rider problems yield rational voter igno-
rance.  To say that these forces have greater impact on one side of the
145. However, environmental advocacy groups operate under budget constraints and would
be more likely to lobby for legislation or pursue enforcement when those actions can produce
financial rewards from a subset of firms who would also benefit.  One result of this incentive
structure is the biasing of environmentalist activity toward remunerative or low-cost activities
and away from those activities that are in line with the groups’ central mission—those which are
most likely to produce environmental restoration or conservation.  See Bruce Yandle, Bootleg-
gers and Baptists—The Education of a Regulatory Economist, 7 REG. 12 (1983).
146. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Americans for the Environment in Support of Petitioners
at 9, Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167 (No. 98-822).
147. For a discussion of the implications of rational voter ignorance, see JAMES M.
BUCHANAN, PUBLIC FINANCE IN DEMOCRATIC PROCESS: FISCAL INSTITUTIONS AND
INDIVIDUAL CHOICE 6-7 (1967).
148. The lack of knowledge of the “concerned” citizens in the Laidlaw case illustrates the
point.  They apparently were unaware that their concerns about Laidlaw’s emissions damaging
water quality were unfounded.  See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528
U.S. 167, 178 (2000) (stating that “Laidlaw has been in substantial compliance with all parame-
ters in its NPDES permit since at least August 1992”).
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issue than the other is speculation based more on advocacy than on
evidence.
More importantly, appeals to majoritarian preferences are based
on the implicit presumption that simple majority decision rules pro-
duce socially desirable decisions.  Fallacies in this proposition have
been central tenets of welfare economics and public choice analysis
for many years.149  Simply put, majoritarian decision mechanisms do
not provide a means for voters to reveal intensity of preference, i.e.,
benefits and costs, in the decision-making process.  As a consequence,
a small number of voters who experience great harm as a result of a
collective decision can be out-voted by a larger number of individuals
who experience only small gains from the decision.  Further, majority
voting is potentially confiscatory, in that a majority can vote to take
the property of a minority of voters.  Wetlands and endangered spe-
cies legislation might be examples.  In short, majority voting rules are
very poor decision-making mechanisms for issues related to how spe-
cific scarce resources are to be used.  In light of this, it is very difficult
to take seriously complaints150 that recent Court decisions have not
adhered to majoritarian preferences.
VI.  OPENING A CAN OF HARMS: FROM “CONCERN” TO STANDING
IN LAIDLAW
The capital of all the individuals of a nation, has its limits in
the same manner as that of a single individual, and is capable
of executing only certain purposes.151
While we prefer to leave the legal pros and cons of Court deci-
sions to legal scholars, as economists, we would be remiss if we did
not address the Court’s interpretation of “harm” in their recent deci-
sion in Laidlaw.  Specifically, the majority opinion of the Court was
that “concern” about possible damages from emissions by Laidlaw
Environmental Services was adequate to show harm, even though
there appeared to be no evidence that Laidlaw’s emissions actually
caused any environmental damage.152  Certainly, concern can impose
149. See, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 156 (2d ed.
1986); see also JAMES M. BUCHANAN & MARILYN R. FLOWERS, THE PUBLIC FINANCES: AN
INTRODUCTORY TEXTBOOK 124 (5th ed. 1980); Gordon Tullock, Problems with Majority Vot-
ing, 67 J. POL. ECON. 571 (1959).
150. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of Americans for the Environment in Support of Peti-
tioners, at 3-10, Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167 (No. 98-822).
151. SMITH, supra note 1, at 347.
152. The District Court concluded that there had been “no demonstrated proof of harm to
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psychic costs on individuals, and such psychic costs can be legitimately
included in a reasonable assessment of benefits and costs.  However,
this ruling has the bizarre consequence of assigning significant weight
to concerns that appear to have been unfounded.
As in all other cases, resources available to courts are scarce.
One economic function of standing rules is to ration those scarce re-
sources in such a way that relatively more meritorious and substantive
cases are adjudicated, while less substantive cases are resolved in
other ways.153  For the Court to rule in favor of standing for an indi-
vidual who “was concerned that the river was polluted by Laidlaw’s
discharges,” despite the (implicit) finding that Laidlaw’s discharges
did not in fact pollute the river, appears to be pure folly.  It would ap-
pear to open the court system to a potential barrage of trivial suits.
Significantly, there is apparently nothing limiting the application of
this principle outside environmental cases.  In antitrust cases, for ex-
ample, the concern of monopolization might be enough to warrant
standing.
Additionally, because of the complexity of the economic and en-
vironmental systems being regulated, environmental laws are inher-
ently imprecise and vague on many points.  Hence, reasonable en-
forcement of such laws must depend on reasonable decisions by ad-
ministrators and courts in determining when violations are sufficiently
serious to warrant action.  If “concern,” no matter how unfounded
that concern, is now adequate to not only gain access to the court but
to also warrant punitive action, then the Court has made a major step
toward removing all reason from this particular facet of the judicial
process.
VII.  CONCLUSION
The proposition is so very manifest, that it seems ridiculous to take
any pains to prove it; nor could it ever have been called in question,
had not the interested sophistry of merchants and manufacturers
confounded the common sense of mankind.154
the environment,” that the “permit violations at issue in this citizen suit did not result in any
health risk or environmental harm,” and that the “available data . . . fail to show that Laidlaw’s
actual discharges have resulted in harm to the North Tyger River.”  Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 956 F. Supp. 588, 600, 602, 603 (D.S.C. 1997).  However, the Su-
preme Court majority opinion held that the relevant showing for standing “is not injury to the
environment but injury to the plaintiff.”  See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181.
153. See Kenneth E. Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court—A Functional Analysis, 86
HARV. L. REV. 645 (1973).
154. SMITH, supra note 1, at 461.
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This article has addressed some of the central economic issues in
citizen-suit provisions of environmental legislation and the doctrine of
standing.  We have not attempted to address the perennial separation
of powers issues, the consistency or inconsistency of the Court’s deci-
sions on standing, possible political or personal motivations of Su-
preme Court Justices, or any legal convolutions surrounding the
standing issue.
Instead, we have discussed the economic incentives of environ-
mental advocacy groups and industrial interest groups, hoping to shed
some light upon the economic consequences of a case like Laidlaw
that changes the standing landscape.  Laidlaw may be expected to in-
crease the effectiveness of environmental interest groups as they help
enforce environmental legislation—and consequently augment the
demonstrably monopolizing effect on industry that many environ-
mental rules have.  Environmental advocacy groups, as they change
bundles of property rights, should benefit through credit projects and
above-cost reimbursements of attorneys’ fees.  Certain firms will en-
joy monopoly rents from the effective suppression of rivals provided
by environmental regulations.  Other firms will suffer as more politi-
cally successful competitors manage to deploy more “concerned citi-
zens” against them in court.  Consumers, the least well-organized in-
terest group, may be expected to absorb much of the cost of well-
enforced environmental rules through higher prices for goods and
services.
Though we have focused on the economic effects of changes in
standing rules, throughout this article we have touched on the eco-
nomic functions of standing.  Standing restrictions can maintain the
fairness of the order in which cases are heard,155 and force trivial or
subjective grievances toward other avenues for resolution.
Furthermore, “majoritarian interests” provide a poor rationale
for lowered barriers to standing.  The economics of collective action
show that majority voting is a poor decision mechanism for issues re-
lated to resource allocation.  Notably, citizen-suit provisions do not
overcome obstacles to the expression of majoritarian interests.
Finally, the Laidlaw Court’s willingness to weight the subjective
concerns of plaintiffs more heavily than objective measures of pollu-
tion damage seems to open the door to a flood of suits based on the
unfounded worries of countless citizen plaintiffs.  The inscrutable
155. See Stearns, Standing and Social Choice, supra note 71.
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logic behind the majority opinion in Laidlaw signals that there is no
limitation on lawsuits by any group having a member living in the vi-
cinity of the alleged violator.  If this decision produces offspring in
other areas of law, such as antitrust, the economic effects could be
far-reaching indeed.
